Online Appendices for Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability

The following appendices are not intended for publication.

A Formal Model

To see how split responsibility for policy affects electoral accountability, we develop a retrospective voting model with incomplete information, based on the two-period selection model in Fearon (1999).[29] In the original model, an Incumbent politician selects a policy; a unified group of Citizens then observes a noisy signal of this policy choice and decides whether to re-elect the Incumbent or vote for a Challenger. The winner of the election selects the policy in period two. The model can be used to represent any unidimensional policy space, for example the tax rate, level of public goods provision, or degree of rent seeking. We extend the Fearon model by making the policy a function of a contest between two separate actors within the government. While here we call these the Politician and the Bureaucrat, the model could also apply to cases where policy is jointly decided by politicians and the judiciary, or when responsibility is split between two politicians or parties.

In our model, the Politician's and Bureaucrat's policy decisions are represented by $x_P \geq 0$ and $x_B \geq 0$, respectively. Nature randomly draws which policy will be enacted. With probability $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ the Incumbent's policy x_P is enacted; with probability $(1 - \gamma)$ the Bureaucrat's policy x_B is enacted.[30] The parameter γ represents the balance of power between the incumbent and the bureaucrat; it is the main parameter of interest in our model. The Citizens observe a policy, $z \in \mathbb{R}$ in each period that is a noisy signal of the two officials' choices. In expectation, the policy Citizens observe is:

$$z = \gamma(-x_P^2) + (1 - \gamma)(-x_B^2) + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

[29] An alternative approach would be a nested principal-agent model. We prefer the retrospective voting model because it focuses on our main dynamic of interest—citizens' perceptions and voting decisions—rather than the interactions between politicians and bureaucrats.

[30] The main comparative statics of the model also hold if the observed policy is a weighted average of x_P and x_B.

where the error term, ϵ, represents the fact that observed policy may also be affected by random shocks; ϵ is drawn from some distribution $f(\cdot)$ that is mean-zero, symmetric, and unimodal at zero.[31] Citizens are therefore uncertain about whose preferences the observed policy represents, but know that when γ is high, the observed policy is more likely to reflect the Politician's preferred option. Citizens get utility of z in each period; they prefer $x_P = x_B = 0$.

All Politicians and Bureaucrats are either "good" or "bad" types: a good type shares citizens' preferences and sets $x_i = 0$, while a bad type sets $x_i = \hat{x} > 0$. These preferences can be inherent to each individual, or may represent the incentives created by their political parties (for politicians) or their principals (for bureaucrats). For example, if bureaucrats are responsible to higher-level appointed officials, whether they implement citizens' preferences may depend on whether this is also in line with higher-ups' preferences, or whether those higher-ups expect the bureaucrat the collude in corruption or malfeasance. Regardless, the important assumption is that there is variation in type, and that citizens know that this is the case. Any ability of politicians to alter bureaucrats' utility is incorporated into the balance of power γ: if politicians can affect bureaucrats' utility, either directly or by working with higher-level bureaucrats or politicians, this will tend to increase γ.

We assume that citizens have no direct power over the bureaucrat, other than their ability to replace the politician. At the end of period 1, Citizens can choose whether to keep the Incumbent or, at no cost, replace them with a Challenger. The Citizens' prior is that the Incumbent and Challenger are each good with probability $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, and the Bureaucrat is good with probability $\beta \in [0, 1]$. In the second period, the Bureaucrat and the Politician in power implement their preferred policy, and payoffs are realized. The Citizens maximize their expected second-period utility by maximizing the probability that the Politician in period 2 is a good type; the Bureaucrat will always remain in office for both periods.

The model makes two main assumptions. First, we assume that the Bureaucrat will

[31] A normal distribution satisfies these requirements.

always attempt to implement his preferred policy, and the balance of power γ determines the extent to which they can do so. The γ term incorporates the degree to which the Politician can monitor the Bureaucrat; as the Politician's power increases, the ability of a good (bad) Bureaucrat to positively (negatively) affect policy decreases. When $\gamma = 1$, the Politician has sole control over policy, and the model is identical to the original Fearon model; this is also observationally equivalent to a world where politicians can ensure that bureaucrats share their preferences, for example through monitoring and the power to hire or fire bureaucrats at will.

Second, we assume that Politicians vary in their preferred policy x_P, but not in their power γ: for Politicians in a particular government (local or national), γ is constant for all potential candidates, and the value of this parameter is common knowledge to all players.[32] This could be because there are structural factors limiting politicians' control of bureaucrats—in Uganda, local politicians cannot unilaterally fire appointed officials—or because all candidates have approximately the same formal training and capacity for monitoring and control. This is in line with the actual pool of candidates in many local elections, especially in developing countries; due to low general education and training levels, there often does not exist a willing and able pool of high-quality candidates who could increase γ, and so citizens assume that it is fixed.[33]

Recall that the probability that the Bureaucrat is a bad type and sets $x_B = \hat{x} > 0$ is $1 - \beta$. To increase tractability, we assume that citizens use the expected value of x_B, given β, when they update their belief about the likelihood that the Incumbent is a good type. Citizens therefore assume that the observed policy z is generated using expectation x_B, and can be written:

$$z = -\gamma x_P^2 - (1-\gamma)(1-\beta)\hat{x}^2 + \epsilon \tag{2}$$

[32]It is likely that γ varies by level of government, even within a country. In general, higher-level officials are likely to be higher capacity and thus have higher values of γ.

[33]See discussion in main paper.

Citizens' optimal strategy is to observe the policy outcome, z, and apply Bayes' rule to update their belief that the Incumbent is a good type. The next section shows that this generates a condition in which Citizens will keep the Incumbent when, given $\epsilon \sim f(\cdot)$, the probability that the policy was decided by a good type is higher than the probability that it was decided by a bad type.[34] Citizens will therefore keep the incumbent when:

$$f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) \geq f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2 + \gamma\hat{x}^2) \tag{3}$$

Recall that $f(\epsilon)$ is uni-modal at zero, symmetric, and mean-zero. If $z > 0$, the condition in Equation 3 will always hold. If $z < 0$, it will only hold when $-z - (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) \leq z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2 + \gamma\hat{x}^2$. Solving generates a voting threshold for the Citizens; they will keep the Incumbent when

$$z \geq -\hat{x}^2 * [(1-\beta)(1-\gamma) + \frac{\gamma}{2}] = k^* \ . \tag{4}$$

We now examine the probability that each type of Politician is re-elected, given Citizens' voting threshold k^*. Our main comparative static is how γ affects electoral accountability. Accountability is increasing in the probability that a good type is kept in office, or a bad type removed from office. The probability an Incumbent is re-elected is the probability that $z \geq k^*$, given $\epsilon \sim F(\cdot)$ and x_P. A good Incumbent sets $x_P = 0$, and the probability they are re-elected is

$$Pr(-(1-\gamma)(1-\beta)\hat{x}^2 + \epsilon \geq k^*). \tag{5}$$

Simplifying, the probability a good Incumbent is kept is $1 - F(-\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2)$. Following a similar process for a bad Incumbent, we find that the probability of re-election is $1 - F(\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2)$.[35]

This brings us to the main comparative static of the model: as γ increases, $1 - F(-\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2)$

[34]Formally, when $Pr(x_P = 0|z) > Pr(x_P = \hat{x}|z)$.

[35]See below for full derivation of these probabilities.

increases, while $1 - F(\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2)$ decreases. This means that, as the Politician gains more power over the Bureaucrat, electoral accountability improves—the probability that a good type is re-elected increases, while the probability that a bad type is re-elected decreases. When γ is low, electoral accountability is worse. Good types are more likely to be mistakenly removed from office, and bad types are more likely to be kept. As γ approaches zero, the probability that either type is kept converges to one half, and elections can no longer separate good and bad types.

A.1 Full Solution: The Citizen's Voting Decision

The previous section said that "Citizens will keep the Incumbent when, given $\epsilon \sim f(\cdot)$, the probability that the policy was decided by a good type is higher than the probability that it was decided by a bad type." This section derives this result. Given that they observe some policy z, Citizens will maximize their expected period-2 utility by re-electing the Incumbent if $Pr(x_P = 0|z) \geq \alpha$. Given the signal z, a citizen who uses Bayes' rule to update will have a posterior belief of:

$$P(x_P = 0|z) = \frac{P(z|x_P = 0) * P(x_P = 0)}{P(z)} \tag{6}$$

The three individual components are:

$$P(z|x_P = 0) = f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) \tag{7}$$

$$P(x_P = 0) = \alpha \tag{8}$$

$$P(z) = \alpha * f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) + (1-\alpha) * f(z + \gamma\hat{x}^2 + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) \tag{9}$$

The citizen will therefore keep the incumbent when

$$\alpha * \frac{f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2)}{\alpha * f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) + (1-\alpha) * f(z + \gamma\hat{x}^2 + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2)} \geq \alpha \tag{10}$$

which simplifies to:

$$f(z + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) \geq f(z + \gamma\hat{x}^2 + (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2) \tag{11}$$

This last equation has a natural interpretation: the left-hand side is the probability that the policy was determined by a Good type, and the right-hand side is the probability that the policy was determined by a Bad type. Thus, the Incumbent will be kept when the probability the policy was a generated by a good type is at least as high as the probability that it was generated by a bad type.

A.2 Full Solution: The Likelihood Good and Bad Types Are Re-elected

A Good politician sets $x_P = 0$, and the probability they are re-elected is the probability that, given γ, β, and $f(\epsilon)$,

$$z = -(1-\gamma)(1-\beta)\hat{x}^2 + \epsilon \geq k^* \tag{12}$$

As $k^* = -\hat{x}^2 * ((1-\beta)(1-\gamma) + \frac{\gamma}{2})$, we can therefore write the probability that the Good politician is kept as:

$$Pr(-(1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2 + \epsilon \geq -\hat{x}^2 * ((1-\beta)(1-\gamma) + \frac{\gamma}{2})) \tag{13}$$

$$Pr(\epsilon \geq \hat{x}^2[(1-\beta)(1-\gamma) - (1-\beta)(1-\gamma) - \frac{\gamma}{2}]) \tag{14}$$

$$= 1 - Pr(\epsilon \leq -\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2) \tag{15}$$

$$= 1 - F(-\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2) \tag{16}$$

Let $A_G = -\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2$. As γ increases, A_G decreases. This implies that $F(A_G)$ also decreases, and so $1 - F(A_G)$ increases. Therefore, as power shifts towards the Incumbent, the likelihood that a Good type is re-elected increases.

We can follow a similar process for a "Bad" Incumbent, who is kept when

$$Pr(-\gamma\hat{x}^2 - (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\hat{x}^2 + \epsilon \geq k^*) \tag{17}$$

$$= Pr(\epsilon \geq (\gamma - \frac{\gamma}{2})\hat{x}^2) \tag{18}$$

$$= 1 - F(\frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2) \tag{19}$$

Let $A_B = \frac{\gamma}{2}\hat{x}^2$. Now as γ increases, A_B increases and so $F(A_B)$ also increases. This means that as γ increases $1 - F(A_B)$ decreases: when the Incumbent has more power, the likelihood a Bad type is re-elected decreases.

B Local Government Institutions in Uganda

Uganda is heavily decentralized, with five levels of local jurisdictions: the district (Local Council 5), the county (Local Council 4), the subcounty (Local Council 3), the parish (Local Council 2), and the village (Local Council 1). In practice, only the district, subcounty, and village have formal government bodies. The village government consists of one directly elected village chairperson and does not have its own budget or administrative staff, so we focus our discussion on the district and the subcounty. At each level, government consists of a political wing – the Local Council – and a bureaucratic wing. Local Councils (LCs) are the highest political authority in their area of jurisdiction. The structure and functions of local governments are delineated in the Local Governments Act from 1997.

Level	Units
Central Government	
Local Council V: Districts	112
Local Council IV: Counties	249
Local Council III: Subcounties	1,403
Local Council II: Parishes	7,431
Local Council I: Villages	57,842

Source: Ugandan Electoral Commission, 2016.

B.1 District Government (LC5)

The district government has two wings, one political, one technical. The first is an elected Local Council, consisting of two representatives (one male and one female) from each subcounty, special councilors representing women, youths, and persons with disabilities, and the LC5 Chairperson, the highest elected political leader in the district. All council members are directly elected in partisan first-past-the-post elections. The term is five years, there are no term limits. The second is the administrative offices, led by the head district bureaucrat – the Chief Administrative Officer, or CAO. The CAO oversees the district technical staff

(including water, health, and education staff, engineers, and planners) and is appointed by the central government.

District-level officials have a range of powers and responsibilities in their area. In particular, they have authority to (and in many cases are required to) do the following:

- Make local policy and regulate the delivery of services;
- Formulate development plans based on local priorities;
- Receive, raise, manage and allocate revenue through approval and execution of budgets;
- Monitor implementation of national and district programs;
- Appoint statutory commissions, boards and committees.

Until 2005, the main source of local revenue was the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT), a small cash tax levied primarily on adult men. Highly unpopular, it was abolished prior to the 2006 elections, making district governments much more reliant on the central government for their budgets.[36] In its 2010 Annual Report, the Local Government Finance Commission notes that central government grants represented 90% of local government budgets, with 85.9% of these funds coming in the form of conditional grants, which are tied to specific spending objectives.[37] This implies very limited discretion for Local Governments on budget decisions. Interviews with district and subcounty officials in Northern Uganda suggest that these funds mostly go towards administrative expenses, with little going to actual program implementation. In particular, there is little flexibility to address any local needs that arise.

[36]See Fjeldstad, O.H. and Therkildsen, O., 2008. Mass taxation and state-society relations in East Africa. Taxation and State Building in Developing Countries for more details on the history of the graduated personal tax in Uganda.

[37]Annual Report of the Local Government Finance Commission, Ugandan Ministry of Local Government, 2010.

B.2 Subcounty Government: LC3

While the subcounty government has a much smaller staff than the district, the overall structure is largely the same, as summarized in Section 3. The subcounty government consists of an elected LC3 council and chairperson, as well as an appointed bureaucrat, the subcounty chief, who reports both to the council and to the district CAO and oversees a small technical staff. As in the district government, the balance between the bureaucratic and political arms of the government is supposed to be one of checks and balances. Civil servants effectively control finances and are the sole account signatories. Politicians are not handling money, but are tasked with monitoring its use.

The subcounty is also the lowest level of the LC system to have an official budget. While a small portion of this money comes from locally-collected taxes and fees (including market fees, land use fees, and permits), most funds are transfers from the district or central government. Two of the key tasks of the subcounty government are (i) to undertake development planning each year, gathering information from constituent villages and parishes and creating a prioritized development program that is passed on to the district, and (ii) to provide basic services such as boreholes, maintenance of feeder road, and latrines. Subcounty councilors are also involved in dispute resolution.

Table B1: Distribution of Subcounty Populations

Percentile	Population
25%	13,153
50%	20,003
75%	31,276
95%	49,954
Mean	24,878
Standard Deviation	24,586
N	1,388

Data source: Ugandan National Census, 2014.

C Qualitative Data

Below are excerpts from qualitative interviews conducted by one of the authors with local council (LC3) members–local politicians–in eight subcounties across four Ugandan districts in May 2016. Interviews were conducted by the author and a local research assistant in the local language, unless the respondent was fluent in English, and in places where the conversation could not be overheard. At the beginning of the interview, respondents were informed that the conversation was confidential and participation voluntary. Respondents were interviewed alone or together with another council member they identified as a close colleague. The author introduced herself as a researcher interested in learning about local government practices.

Interview ID: DI3

"It has been very tough since they brought in the new chief. With the old chief we used to have meetings, but the new one just says 'There is no money', also for monitoring. This makes it very difficult for councilors to be involved. [...] The chief does not give us the budget, there is no transparency. It is quite very difficult for us to monitor. For us, as parish councilors, they take you like you are not important. If you ask for detailed info, they hide it."

Interview ID: CI2

"Here at the subcounty it's hard to get [budget and expenditure] documents from the technical personnel, they keep telling us it's above us and that we should do things as per our level."

Interview ID: CII1

"The technical people know that nothing can move without money, so they use their financial

power to control everything. The main problem is that the council and committees don't meet [formal meetings require budget allocations for allowances]. Yet that is where you track progress. When the council is not meeting we can't know how much money has come."

What about ledger books and bank statements – can you access those?

"[Laughter.] You cannot get them! If you start inquiring so much they say 'do you want to do my job?!' There are things that are hidden. Technocrats don't want us to see the bank statements because it shows how much local revenue was collected, which they use for their ends. The information remains sheltered among technocrats, all the way from the district. They don't want us to see it. The district technocrats protect their people. They may also get their money from there."

Interview ID: CI1

How are things in this subcounty?

"We have technocrats who take their own decisions. We had planned for the council to construct a road, but the technocrats diverted that money to buy land for a school. They informed the councilor only later and told them the district would support the road [instead]. Hence, the council approved the divergence of the money.

Since the councilors are not in the know, the technocrats just do shoddy work and the councilors face the problems. We suspect that the technocrats and the contractors are conniving and eat a lot of money.

The land was bought at 4 million but they do not have any evidence how much money was actually spent because the technocrats do not share the documents. They just give us block figures, but no details. 'I'm not ready, I'm not ready' is what they say when we ask for council minutes."

[. . .]

"We have less influence on budget formulation because the technical people say that the government has guidelines on what the budget is supposed to look and if we don't follow them the district will get the penalty. They are the technical people so they know the rules. The technocrats write the budget, including the location of projects such as roads, boreholes etc. When we complain they say the direction comes from the district. Yet we are on the ground and know best so we should be consulted.

Initially, we had powers of deciding which villages get boreholes. We still send priorities, but they often don't follow them and don't even inform us. After we've decided we go to the villages and inform them "we have lobbied for a borehole for you". And then they see other villages get boreholes! This makes us look very bad. It'd be better if all those decisions were just taken at the district, instead of giving out the mandate and then not following it. We are just wasting our time!

There is nothing we can do at the local level! We have lost confidence. We have complained many times about the [subcounty] chief to the CAO [head bureaucrat at the district] yet he says: 'there is nowhere I can transfer the chief, no one wants him.'"

Interview ID: BII1

What are some of the challenges you face in this subcounty, besides lack of funds?

"Relationships between councilors and technocrats are not good. As councilors, we bring the views from the villages to the technocrats so that they implement. When technocrats fail to implement our resolutions without any reason then that means there is an issue."

How easy is it to get financial information?

"It's not easy. They dodge, dodge you. You only get it if you persist. But you may get it when it is useless – they delay until the information is old. It is intentional.

We have local revenue here. Councilors get their allowances from that. We can also use that

money for programs. So we want to get that information [about local revenue]. The sources for local revenue are many. But they don't want to share the report. I am suspecting that the chairperson and the chief know. The money is not coming directly into the treasury.

The technocrats want their things in the corner, corner [hidden]. So if they see someone [a politician] who is very strict and wants something worked on immediately, they don't like it."

D District Selection and Survey Details

D.1 Vignette and Survey Questions

This section reports the full text of the vignette experiment used in the citizen and officials survey. For enumeration the vignette was translated into the dominant local language.

Vignette Text:

Let me give you an imaginary example about a subcounty in a nearby district. In that subcounty, the feeder roads are [not being/well] maintained and [are in very bad condition - people cannot pass, and the sick cannot get to the health centre in time/people can get to town and the health centre easily]. Both the LC3 chairperson and the subcounty chief have some power over roads. Both have been in office all term. [The subcounty chief comes from another district, the LC3 chairperson is from that same district/Both are from that same district.]

IN YOUR OPINION, who is more at fault that the roads are not maintained – the subcounty chief, who is from [that same/another] district, or the LC3 chairperson, who is from that same district?

Now, recall that in this example the roads in the subcounty are poor. While the LC3 Chairman, who is from that same district, and the Subcounty Chief], who is from [that same/another] district, both have power over roads, in this case it is primarily the [LC3

Chairperson/Chief] who deserves [credit/blame] for the quality of the roads. How do you think this situation will affect the next election, if at all? The LC3 Chair loses a lot of votes, the LC3 Chair loses some votes, there is no effect on voting, the LC3 Chair gains some votes, or the LC3 Chair gains a lot of votes.

Text of module testing perceptions of insider and outsider bureaucrats Now I will read you a number of statements about a Subcounty Chief who is from [that same district where he works/another district than where he works]. We are not talking about this subcounty but in general. For each statement, please tell me how much you agree or disagree – strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.

. . . will use any opportunity to give jobs and development projects to his people, instead of thinking of the entire subcounty.

. . . will work hard to use limited resources efficiently.

. . . has strong social ties with people in the community.

. . . will have good information about what citizens in the subcounty need.

. . . has a lot of power over what happens in the subcounty.

. . . will work hard to lobby the district for more resources to the subcounty.

. . . will feel ashamed if he or she does not work hard to meet citizens' needs.

. . . will listen to and respect the local citizens.

. . . would embezzle subcounty money if he had the chance.

. . . will be neutral and objective in how he allocates resources and deals with citizens.

D.2 District Selection

For the Officials survey, districts were selected for regional spread, the absence of large interventions aimed at improving accountability, and relatively high performance with regard

to budget reporting.[38] Within study districts, nearly all rural subcounties were included in the sample, excluding a handful for logistical reasons, such as location on a remote island. For the Citizen survey, although districts cover the Northern, Western, and Central region of the country, they are ultimately a convenience sample. Districts were selected on the basis of presence of implementing partners for the field experiment in which this survey experiment was embedded.[39]

E Perception of Outsider Bureaucrats

To assess perceptions of insider and outsider bureaucrats, we asked a random subset of the citizen sample five questions about the quality and influence of a hypothetical local bureaucrat, who was either an insider or outsider. To avoid survey fatigue, respondents were randomly selected to receive one of two possible sets of five questions; each question was answered on a 6-point agree/disagree scale. Three questions related to the perceived influence of the hypothetical bureaucrat: whether the hypothetical bureaucrat is expected to have power over the subcounty ($HasPwr$), to have good social ties with locals ($SocTies$), and to have good information about citizens' needs ($HasInfo$).

The remaining variables relate to quality, or type: whether the hypothetical bureaucrat is expected to be likely to engage in patronage ($Patron$, entering negatively), to work hard ($WorkHrd$), to lobby hard for the subcounty ($Lobby$), to feel shame for doing his job poorly ($Shame$), to listen to local citizens ($Listens$), to embezzle funds ($Embez$, entering negatively), and to be neutral and objective when making decisions ($Neutral$). To increase power, we use the responses from both the Credit and Blame treatments for the perceptions analysis, but add an indicator variable for the Blame treatment to the analysis.

[38]Sample districts for the Officials survey include Butambala, Lwengo, Kalungu, Bukomansimbi, Mityana, Kyankwanzi, Lyantonde, Sironko, Namayingo, Iganga, Kaliro, Buyende, Mayuge, Butaleja, Serere, Kumi, Ngora, Kitgum, Otuke, Mitooma, Ibanda, Buhweju, Kibaale, Kabale, and Ntoroko.

[39]Sample districts for the Citizen survey include Apac, Kitgum, Agago, Mubende, Nakaseke, and Kibaale.

Figure 2 summarizes the results. Compared to a hypothetical insider bureaucrat, outsiders are viewed as less powerful and – mostly – as of lower quality.



Figure 2: Perception of Outsider Bureaucrats

Displaying average treatment effects of a hypothetical bureaucrat coming from another district, as compared to coming from the same district, on perceived power and quality among citizens. Outcome variables are agreements/disagreements with statements about the hypothetical bureaucrat, measures on a six-point scale. Showing 95% (bold) and 90% (thin) confidence intervals.

The differences in assessments of insider and outsider bureaucrats are significant in eight of the ten questions. Of those eight questions, the insider is perceived as better than the outsider in seven. Respondents do not appear to perceive significant differences in the likelihood that insiders or outsiders will embezzle funds or be neutral in how they do their job. Differences in perceptions are starkest in the three measures relating to perceived power.

Dependent variable:	**Power**	Social Ties	Good Info	Has Power	**Quality 1**	No Patro	Work Hard	**Quality 2**	Feel Shame	Listens	No Embezzle	Neutral
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Outsider bureaucrat	-0.20**	-0.19**	-0.23**	-0.18**	0.00	0.11*	-0.10*	-0.11**	-0.17**	-0.13**	-0.07	0.02
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.14**	-0.16*	-0.09	-0.13*	-0.01	0.08	-0.11	-0.02	0.04	-0.07	0.07	0.00
	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Assigned to bad roads	-0.30**	-0.36**	-0.25**	-0.28**	-0.02	0.26**	-0.31**	-0.24**	-0.17**	-0.29**	-0.20**	-0.30**
	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Pol. responsible*Bad roads	0.16*	0.11	0.16	0.16	0.03	-0.07	0.14	0.12*	0.11	0.20*	0.07	0.10
	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.054)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.056)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Constant	0.24**	0.29**	0.19**	0.25**	0.01	-0.19**	0.22**	0.14**	0.08	0.19**	0.08	0.12*
	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Observations	2,102	2,043	2,039	2,045	2,087	2,041	2,000	2,120	2,074	2,080	1,973	2,013
R-squared	0.053	0.056	0.026	0.033	0.002	0.044	0.050	0.044	0.019	0.031	0.028	0.030

Notes: Z-score indices (in bold) and their standardized components. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table E1: Perception of Bureaucrats Based on Insider Status

F Robustness Checks

F.1 Robustness Checks of Table 2 – Effect of Insider-Outsider Treatment on Attribution

Table F1: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - Indifferent Responses Treated as Missing Values

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible			
Sample:	Citizens	All Officials	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.060**	0.039*	0.016	0.153**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.052)
Assigned to bad roads	0.013	-0.083**	-0.073**	-0.106*
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.052)
Constant	0.680**	0.803**	0.868**	0.450**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.045)
Observations	6,066	2,410	2,032	378
R-squared	0.010	0.036	0.044	0.116

Notes: Replication of Table 2 (OLS). The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery, *now assigning missing values to indifferent respondents*. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F2: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - Probit

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible			
Sample:	Citizens	All Officials	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.207**	0.136*	0.067	0.429**
	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.140)
Assigned to bad roads	0.054	-0.291**	-0.318**	-0.288*
	(0.033)	59)	(0.070)	(0.140)
Constant	0.352**	0.710**	0.933**	-0.267
	(0.048)	(0.141)	(0.163)	(0.329)
Observations	6,251	2,410	2,032	378
Pseudo R-squared	0.009	0.035	0.052	0.091

Notes: Probit estimation of Table 2. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F3: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - No Covariates

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible			
Sample:	Citizens	All Officials	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.072**	0.039*	0.017	0.149**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.052)
Assigned to bad roads	0.019	-0.084**	-0.073**	-0.111*
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.052)
Constant	0.651**	0.803**	0.867**	0.455**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.045)
Observations	6,251	2,410	2,032	378
R-squared	0.010	0.035	0.042	0.098

Notes: Replication Table 2 without covariates (OLS). The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. The specification includes district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F4: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - Missing Covariates Not Imputed

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible			
Sample:	Citizens	All Officials	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.073**	0.041*	0.016	0.163**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.053)
Assigned to bad roads	0.020	-0.085**	-0.073**	-0.117*
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.053)
Constant	0.650**	0.805**	0.868**	0.452**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.045)
Observations	6,214	2,400	2,032	368
R-squared	0.011	0.038	0.044	0.125

Notes: Replication Table 2 with listwise deletion instead of imputation of missing covariates (OLS). The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. The specification includes district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F5: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - Subcounty Fixed Effects

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible			
Sample:	Citizens	All Officials	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.070**	0.034	0.021	0.270**
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.077)
Assigned to bad roads	0.019	-0.078**	-0.065**	-0.155*
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.078)
Constant	0.651**	0.807**	0.861**	0.410**
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.059)
Observations	6,251	2,370	2,032	338
R-squared	0.030	0.115	0.138	0.690

Notes: Replication Table 2 with subcounty fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F6: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - Citizen Sample Restricted to Men

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible	
Sample:	All citizens	Men only
	(1)	(2)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.072**	0.094*
	(0.012)	(0.040)
Assigned to bad roads	0.019	-0.060
	(0.012)	(0.040)
Constant	0.650**	0.727**
	(0.010)	(0.034)
Observations	6,251	510
R-squared	0.011	0.022

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

F.2 Robustness Checks of Table 3 – Effect of Attribution on Electoral Accountability

Table F7: Expected Change in Future Votes - Binary Outcome

DV:	Expected vote loss			Expected vote gain		
Condition:	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizen	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	0.144**	0.074**	0.099	0.212**	0.346**	0.242**
	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.055)
Prior: Politician responsible	0.083**	-0.005	0.064	0.082**	0.016	0.032
	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.058)
Constant	0.602**	0.899**	0.779**	0.484**	0.504**	0.634**
	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.045)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.040	0.039	0.163	0.064	0.236	0.257

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable *expected vote loss* takes value 1 if respondents expect a politician to *lose* some or a lot of votes, 0 otherwise. Conversely, the dependent variable *expected vote gain* takes value 1 if respondents expect a politician to *gain* some or a lot of votes, 0 otherwise. $Prior$ is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Our theory predicts that the coefficients on Info and Prior should be positive in all columns. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F8: Expected Change in Future Votes - Ordered Probit

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.431**	-0.608**	-0.576*	0.552**	1.132**	1.077**
	(0.085)	(0.136)	(0.275)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.244)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.220*	-0.046	-0.366	0.219*	0.055	0.197
	(0.093)	(0.165)	(0.274)	(0.086)	(0.118)	(0.235)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
Pseudo R-squared	0.025	0.075	0.185	0.037	0.150	0.219

Notes: Ordered Probit. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F9: Expected Change in Future Votes - Likert Scale (OLS)

DV:	Expected change in votes (5-point Likert scale)					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.373**	-0.368**	-0.407*	0.614**	1.083**	0.676**
	(0.076)	(0.052)	(0.162)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.170)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.278**	-0.097	-0.235	0.206*	0.018	0.077
	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.161)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.178)
Constant	-0.652**	-1.285**	-1.023**	0.198*	0.327**	0.737**
	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.123)	(0.087)	(0.109)	(0.139)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.041	0.075	0.185	0.070	0.229	0.241

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable is a five-point Likert scale, taking value 1 if a respondent expects the politician to loose a lot of votes, 5 if expected to gain a lot of votes. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F10: Expected Change in Future Votes - Likert Scale (Ordered Probit)

DV:	Expected change in votes (5-point Likert scale)					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.326**	-0.693**	-0.542**	0.506**	0.962**	0.688**
	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.189)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.174)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.274**	-0.153	-0.302	0.167*	0.051	0.080
	(0.079)	(0.102)	(0.191)	(0.074)	(0.102)	(0.176)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
Pseudo R-squared	0.016	0.064	0.104	0.024	0.096	0.103

Notes: Ordered probit. The dependent variable is a five-point Likert scale, taking value 1 if a respondent expects the politician to loose a lot of votes, 5 if expected to gain a lot of votes. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F11: Expected Change in Future Votes - No Covariates

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.238**	-0.107**	-0.181*	0.361**	0.625**	0.410**
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.087)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.098)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.120*	-0.016	-0.098	0.128*	-0.008	0.029
	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.087)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.101)
Constant	-0.375**	-0.826**	-0.656**	0.138*	0.167**	0.397**
	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.079)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.036	0.032	0.147	0.062	0.216	0.220

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. The specification includes district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F12: Expected Change in Future Votes - No Covariates and No District Fixed Effects

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.239**	-0.102**	-0.128	0.360**	0.631**	0.455**
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.082)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.095)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.117*	-0.018	-0.096	0.131*	-0.033	0.041
	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.082)	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.096)
Constant	-0.376**	-0.827**	-0.681**	0.137*	0.185**	0.371**
	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.078)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.031	0.015	0.020	0.049	0.145	0.094

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F13: Expected Change in Future Votes - Missing Covariates Not Imputed

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.241**	-0.106**	-0.170	0.359**	0.625**	0.367**
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.090)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.096)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.118*	-0.018	-0.109	0.133*	-0.011	0.029
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.090)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.101)
Constant	-0.374**	-0.825**	-0.654**	0.134*	0.169**	0.422**
	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.079)
Observations	975	1,013	189	993	1,057	217
R-squared	0.037	0.033	0.156	0.062	0.217	0.273

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. The specification includes district fixed effects and demeaned covariates. In this specification, missing covariates are not imputed. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F14: Expected Change in Future Votes - Subcounty Fixed Effects

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.262**	-0.107**	-0.178	0.351**	0.623**	0.513**
	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.168)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.155)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.114*	-0.043	-0.021	0.120*	-0.022	0.072
	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.172)	(0.060)	(0.073)	(0.207)
Constant	-0.367**	-0.804**	-0.672**	0.148**	0.179*	0.335**
	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.112)	(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.120)
Observations	982	1,013	173	999	1,057	201
R-squared	0.111	0.207	0.877	0.123	0.379	0.887

Notes: Replication of Table 3 with subcounty fixed effects (OLS). The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table F15: Expected Change in Future Votes - Sample Restricted to Men

DV:	Net expected change in votes			
	Bad roads		Good roads	
Sample:	All citizens	Men only	All citizens	Men only
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.238**	-0.223	0.361**	0.227
	(0.047)	(0.167)	(0.052)	(0.243)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.120*	-0.105	0.138*	0.063
	(0.052)	(0.196)	(0.056)	(0.278)
Constant	-0.376**	-0.566*	0.132*	0.455
	(0.050)	(0.265)	(0.054)	(0.356)
Observations	982	86	999	66
R-squared	0.037	0.072	0.063	0.096

Notes: The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change n votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. $Prior$ is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

G Reasoning for Allocation of Responsibility

To assess the extent to which perceived lower power or quality of outsider bureaucrats are driving our results, we run a horserace between the power index and the first quality index, for which we have measures for the same subset of respondents.[40] Table G1 summarizes the results.

Table G1: Determinants of Perceived Politician Responsibility

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Perceived bureaucrat power (index)	-0.026*	-0.028*	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Perceived bureaucrat quality (index 1)	-0.024		-0.029
	(0.017)		(0.017)
Assigned to bad roads	0.020	0.019	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.111**	0.111**	0.116**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.010	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	0.631**	0.631**	0.626**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
N	2,024	2,024	2,024
R^2	0.026	0.025	0.024

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the respondent deems the hypothetical politician as primarily responsible for the quality of services in the subcounty, measured prior to exposure to any treatments. *Perceived bureaucrat power* is an average z-score index consisting of how likely a respondent considers it that the hypothetical bureaucrat (i) has power, (ii) has strong social ties, and (iii) is well informed. *Perceived bureaucrat quality* is an average z-score index consisting of how likely a respondent considers it that the hypothetical bureaucrat (i) work hard and (ii) does not engage in patronage. All index components are measured on a 6-point Likert scale. All specifications include district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

[40]Since respondents were randomly assigned to receive either the power and quality 1 module or the quality 2 module, we cannot run this analysis with the second quality index.

A pilot survey provides additional evidence that citizens attribute responsibility to bureaucrats when they are perceived as powerful. In the survey, we asked 377 small business owners in peri-urban areas to explain why they thought the politician or bureaucrat was more to blame for poor roads. Of those who blamed the bureaucrat, 74% explained their response in terms of the bureaucrat's power or connections to high-level government.[41] Table G2 presents the full results for this question.

Why is it the Chief's fault? (n=141)	
%	Response
35%	Is in charge of implementation & oversight of government projects
24%	Is the boss/formally in charge of subcounty
15%	Is part of government/is connected to higher-level government
9%	Has power over finances
8%	Is a professional/is neutral/is not part of politics
4%	Has more information about the subcounty
1%	Is from another district
1%	Because the LC3 is powerless
1%	Is well educated
1%	He does it on purpose

Why is it the LC3's fault? (n=236)	
%	Response
39%	He/she is elected
17%	Comes from the same area
17%	Has more information about what citizens need
14%	LC3s make promises during campaigns
5%	They are supposed to monitor government projects
4%	Has more power/is the head of the subcounty
2%	Should pass on information/lobby the district or MPs
1%	Is easier to access

Table G2: Open-ended responses for why the bureaucrat or politician is to blame, citizens (pilot)

[41] The modal explanation for blaming the politician was that she "is elected".

H Additional Analyses

Table H1: Heterogeneous Effects by Ethnicity (Table 2)

DV:	Politician Primarily Responsible	
	Citizens	Politicians
Outsider bureaucrat	0.078**	0.049
	(0.022)	(0.038)
Outsider x Main ethnic group	-0.007	-0.040
	(0.026)	(0.042)
Main ethnic group	0.024	0.011
	(0.020)	(0.031)
Assigned to bad roads	0.020	-0.073**
	(0.012)	(0.016)
Constant	0.632**	0.859**
	(0.017)	(0.029)
Observations	6,080	2,032
R-squared	0.011	0.045

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of roads. *Outsider* is an indicator for whether the hypothetical local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district as opposed to being posted in his home district. *Main ethnic group* indicates whether the respondent belongs to the modal ethnic group in the subcounty. The specification includes demeaned covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H2: Heterogeneous Effects by Ethnicity (Table 3)

DV:	Net expected change in votes			
	Bad roads		Good roads	
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Citizens	Politicians
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.286**	-0.181**	0.249*	0.781**
	(0.087)	(0.063)	(0.099)	(0.110)
Info x Main ethnic group	0.070	0.091	0.151	-0.189
	(0.103)	(0.070	(0.118)	(0.122)
Main ethnic group	-0.072	-0.061	-0.051	0.123
	(0.082)	(0.051)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.118*	-0.014	0.122*	-0.007
	(0.053)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.064)
Constant	-0.327**	-0.779**	0.183*	0.063
	(0.078)	(0.053)	(0.084)	(0.100)
Observations	962	1,013	975	1,057
R-squared	0.038	0.035	0.062	0.219

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. *Main ethnic group* indicates that the respondent belongs to the modal ethnic group in the subcounty. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H3: Expected Change in Future Votes - Including Interaction Term

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.231**	-0.112	-0.074	0.409**	0.384**	0.332*
	(0.088)	(0.060)	(0.114)	(0.092)	(0.116)	(0.130)
Info x Prior: Politician responsible	-0.009	0.006	-0.241	-0.041	0.287*	0.161
	(0.105)	(0.067)	(0.182)	(0.113)	(0.127)	(0.204)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.115	-0.021	0.001	0.177*	-0.156	-0.033
	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.120)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.143)
Constant	-0.379**	-0.823**	-0.700**	0.104	0.291**	0.429**
	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.090)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.037	0.033	0.166	0.064	0.221	0.257

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. $Prior$ is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H4: Expected Change in Future Votes - Including Interaction Term

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.243**	-0.105**	-0.315*	0.326**	0.671**	0.493**
	(0.056)	(0.029)	(0.140)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.151)
Prior: Bureaucrat responsible	0.116	0.021	-0.001	-0.198*	0.156	0.033
	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.120)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.143)
Info x Prior	0.017	-0.006	0.241	0.104	-0.287*	-0.161
	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.182)	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.204)
Constant	-0.495**	-0.844**	-0.698**	0.290**	0.135**	0.396**
	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.092)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.105)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.037	0.033	0.166	0.065	0.221	0.257

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. $Prior_Bur$ is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the *bureaucrat* was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H5: Expected Change in Future Votes - Split by Priors (Citizen Sample)

DV:	Net expected change in votes			
	Bad roads		Good roads	
Prior:	Pol responsible	Bur responsible	Pol responsible	Bur responsible
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.241**	-0.231*	0.312**	0.392**
	(0.055)	(0.096)	(0.064)	(0.096)
Constant	-0.498**	-0.382**	0.300**	0.119
	(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.045)	(0.072)
Observations	683	281	647	327
R-squared	0.040	0.032	0.060	0.065

Notes: OLS, sample restricted to citizens. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. Columns (1) and (3) report results for the subset of respondents whose prior was that the hypothetical politician was primarily responsible for the quality of roads in the subcounty, for good and bad roads, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report results for the subset of respondents whose prior was that the hypothetical bureaucrat was primarily responsible instead. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. All specifications include demeaned controls and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H6: Expected Change in Future Votes - Including Interaction Between Info and Outsider

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.264**	-0.136**	0.110	0.349**	0.565**	0.479**
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.128)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.137)
Outsider bureaucrat	-0.041	-0.021	0.275*	-0.099	-0.046	0.091
	(0.067)	(0.038)	(0.120)	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.139)
Info x Outsider bureaucrat	0.051	0.056	-0.533**	0.024	0.123	-0.156
	(0.094)	(0.053)	(0.180)	(0.104)	(0.093)	(0.198)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.118*	-0.018	-0.099	0.143*	-0.008	0.044
	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.087)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.103)
Constant	-0.356**	-0.814**	-0.805**	0.176**	0.188**	0.346**
	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.089)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.106)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.037	0.035	0.201	0.066	0.219	0.257

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. *Outsider* is an indicator for whether the bureaucrat is originally from another district. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H7: Expected Change in Future Votes - Including Interaction Between Prior and Outsider

DV:	Net expected change in votes					
	Bad roads			Good roads		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.067	-0.049	-0.063	0.070	-0.103	0.062
	(0.072)	(0.046)	(0.137)	(0.077)	(0.091)	(0.150)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.063	-0.045	0.077	-0.192*	-0.137	0.030
	(0.088)	(0.060)	(0.121)	(0.092)	(0.116)	(0.132)
Prior x Outsider bureaucrat	-0.110	0.066	-0.092	0.158	0.182	-0.034
	(0.105)	(0.066)	(0.188)	(0.113)	(0.127)	(0.205)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.238**	-0.106**	-0.164	0.359**	0.627**	0.404**
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.089)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.098)
Constant	-0.403**	-0.805**	-0.696**	0.217**	0.238**	0.381**
	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.091)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.098)
Observations	982	1,013	193	999	1,057	224
R-squared	0.038	0.034	0.159	0.068	0.219	0.255

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change in votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. *Outsider* is an indicator for whether the bureaucrat is originally from another district. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H8: Share of Respondents Considering the Politician as Primarily Responsible

Sample	Bad roads	Good roads	p-value
Citizens	70.53	68.67	0.111
Politicians	80.28	87.52	0.000
Bureaucrats	41.62	53.04	0.026

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. The p-value results from a two-sided t-test of a difference in means.

Table H9: Blame and Bureaucrat's Identity - Interacted with Quality of Roads

Dependent variable:	Perceive politician as primarily responsible			
Sample:	Citizens	All Officials	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outsider bureaucrat	0.061**	0.010	-0.023	0.205**
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.075)
Assigned to bad roads	0.007	-0.112**	-0.113**	-0.056
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.074)
Outsider x Assigned to bad roads	0.023	0.058	0.079*	-0.102
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.107)
Constant	0.656**	0.818**	0.887**	0.424**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.052)
Observations	6,251	2,410	2,032	378
R-squared	0.011	0.037	0.047	0.119

Notes: Replication of Table 2 (OLS). The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent's prior is that the politician is primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The independent variable is whether the local bureaucrat was described as coming from another district (*Outsider*) as opposed to being posted in his home district. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H10: Any Expected Change in Future Votes

DV:	Net expected change in votes		
Sample:	Citizens	Politicians	Bureaucrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Info: Politician responsible	0.063**	0.063**	0.085*
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.037)
Assigned to bad roads	0.007	0.072**	0.028
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.037)
Info x Assigned to bad roads	-0.012	-0.020	-0.053
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.054)
Prior: Politician responsible	0.038*	-0.003	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.028)
Constant	0.827**	0.880**	0.875**
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.028)
Observations	1,981	2,070	417
R-squared	0.019	0.079	0.090

Notes: OLS. The dependent variable takes value 1 if a respondent expects a politician to either lose or gain votes, 0 otherwise. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. The specification includes covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table H11: Expected Change in Future Votes – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Citizen Education and Wealth

DV:	Net expected change in votes			
	Bad roads		Good roads	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info: Politician responsible	-0.294**	-0.279**	0.396**	0.482**
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Info x High education	0.112		-0.072	
	(0.094)		(0.105)	
High education	-0.027		0.035	
	(0.070)		(0.079)	
Info x High wealth		0.080		-0.225*
		(0.094)		(0.104)
High wealth		-0.047		0.216**
		(0.072)		(0.080)
Prior: Politician responsible	-0.114*	-0.115*	0.138*	0.137*
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Constant	-0.366**	-0.354**	0.118	0.019
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Observations	982	982	999	999
R-squared	0.038	0.037	0.064	0.069
Coefficient (Info + Info x High education)	-0.182		0.324	
P-value (Info + Info x High education)	0.006		0.000	
Coefficient (Info + Info x High wealth)		-0.199		0.256
P-value (Info + Info x High wealth)		0.003		0.000

Notes: OLS. The sample consists of citizens. The dependent variable takes the value -1 if a respondent expects a politician to lose votes, 0 if no change n votes is expected, and 1 if a vote gain is expected. *Prior* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's initial belief was that the politician was responsible. $Info$ is an indicator for whether the respondent was subsequently assigned to be told that the politician was actually responsible. *High education* indicates that a respondent has completed more than the sample median number of years of formal education, *high wealth* indicates that a respondent's wealth index is above the sample median. The bottom panel shows the the linear combinations of the respective coefficients, as well as the corresponding p-values and can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of information on respondents with education and wealth levels above the median. All specification include demeaned covariates and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.